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In fundamental analysis, increases in the ratio of selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) costs to sales (SG&A ratio) are viewed as negative signals about future firm 
performance. However, this interpretation focuses on the overall change in the SG&A ratio and 
ignores the underlying changes in the components of the ratio. For example, prior literature finds 
that the interpretation offered by fundamental analysis does not hold during periods of 
decreasing sales. I contend that a further partitioning of the full sample into subsamples 
representing all possible combinations of changes in the components of the SG&A ratio, and the 
ratio itself, will yield incremental information about future firm performance. Accordingly, I 
identify six subsamples representing these combinations of changes and examine whether they 
are incrementally informative about future earnings, analyst forecasts, and stock returns. I find 
that changes in the SG&A ratio in four of my six subsamples are associated with changes in 
future earnings, and that results from prior literature regarding periods of decreasing sales are 
driven by a specific set of circumstances. I also find that analysts do not always recognize the 
information in the signals and incorporate the information into their forecast revisions. Finally, I 
find that changes in the SG&A ratio in five of my six subsamples provide statistically significant 
information regarding future stock returns that is not subsumed by the information contained in 
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In fundamental analysis, increases in the ratio of selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) costs to sales (SG&A ratio) are perceived as the inability of managers to control costs. 
This inefficiency is expected to negatively impact future performance (Lev and Thiagarajan 
1993; Anderson et al. 2007). Alternatively, decreases in the SG&A ratio are interpreted as a sign 
of tight managerial control over costs and increased efficiency, which will lead to better future 
performance. However, empirical evidence does not generally support this view. For instance, 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) find no association between changes in the SG&A ratio and 
future earnings changes.  
Anderson et al. (2007) examine this lack of association and explain that the expected 
impact of changes in the SG&A ratio, offered by fundamental analysis, is valid only if SG&A 
costs move proportionately with increases and decreases in sales. Because Anderson et al. (2003) 
find that SG&A costs decrease less when sales decrease than they increase when sales increase, 
Anderson et al. (2007) partition their sample into firm-years with increasing sales and firms with 
decreasing sales. They find that changes in the SG&A ratio are positively associated with future 
earnings when sales are increasing and negatively associated with future earnings when sales are 
decreasing. This partitioning of the sample into periods of increasing and decreasing sales 
provides new findings, however prior literature does not examine the implications of changes in 
both of the components of the SG&A ratio.  
The SG&A ratio is affected by both sales and SG&A costs. In periods where both sales 
and SG&A costs move in the same direction (i.e., both increase or both decrease), the SG&A 
ratio can either increase or decrease because it is a function of the relative changes to the 
separate components. For instance, in a period where sales and SG&A costs both increase, if 
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sales increase by more than SG&A costs, then the SG&A ratio will decrease, and if sales 
increase by less than SG&A costs, then the SG&A ratio will increase. Because changes in the 
components of the SG&A ratio may be informative about future performance, in this study, I 
identify subsamples of firm-years with all possible combinations of changes in the SG&A ratio 
and its components, and I examine whether these changes provide information about future 
earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns.   
Fundamental analysis is primarily concerned with examining specific financial statement 
items and ratios in an attempt to identify information useful for predicting future earnings and 
firm value. Changes in financial statement items and ratios are informative if they provide 
information beyond that contained in current earnings. Prior research finds that fundamental 
signals are incrementally informative about changes in future earnings, that analysts seem to 
understand these signals and incorporate the information into their forecasts, and that these 
signals are associated with future stock returns. However, evidence regarding the 
informativeness of changes in the SG&A ratio is mixed. Anderson et al. (2007) suggest that this 
may be attributable to conflicting information produced by the same signal in different 
circumstances. They test this theory and find that increases in the SG&A ratio signal higher 
future earnings in periods of increasing sales but signal lower future earnings in periods of 
decreasing sales, indicating that changes in the SG&A ratio provide different information in 
different circumstances. Given this, I investigate whether additional information about future 
earnings and firm value can be obtained by identifying all combinations of increasing versus 
decreasing sales, increasing versus decreasing SG&A costs, and increasing versus decreasing 
SG&A ratio.  
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In general, increasing sales is a favorable signal about firm performance. However, when 
sales increase, changes in the SG&A ratio are an ambiguous signal about firm performance. 
When increasing sales are accompanied by decreasing SG&A costs, current period earnings will 
be higher and  may signal improving efficiency. However, decreasing SG&A costs may signal 
that managers are reducing expenses because they expect future demand to be lower.  
There is an analogous ambiguity relating to changes in the SG&A ratio when sales are 
decreasing.  Decreasing SG&A costs might be viewed as preferable to decreasing sales and 
increasing SG&A costs, but the perceived decrease in efficiency in this scenario could signal that 
managers expect higher future demand and are thus increasing SG&A expenditures.  
These different scenarios make interpretation of changes in SG&A ratios difficult. For 
instance, soon after becoming the Chief Financial Officer of Best Buy, Sharon McCollam said, 
“early observations are that the SG&A infrastructure at Best Buy is too high” (Ryan 2013). 
Although sales are decreasing and Best Buy plans to cut $400 million from its SG&A expense, 
“it appears the cuts will only offset additional expenses Best Buy has to make to boost sales and 
compete with low-overhead online retailers” (Ryan 2013). The Best Buy situation is an example 
of a firm with decreasing sales and an increasing SG&A ratio, with the latter being a conscious 
decision made in an effort to improve future performance, rather than an example of a firm that 
has lost control of its spending. Without complete information regarding management’s 
intentions, investors can be left with the difficult task of interpreting the changes on their own. It 
is unclear whether Best Buy’s strategy will be successful, but it demonstrates the difficulty in 
interpreting changes in the SG&A ratio. In this study, I explore whether systematically 
partitioning the changes in the SG&A ratio and its components provides information useful for 
predicting changes in future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns. 
4 
 
To conduct my analyses, I construct a sample of 38,737 firm-year observations from 
1990 through 2010. I then partition the full sample into six mutually exclusive subsamples based 
on changes in the SG&A ratio, changes in sales, and changes in SG&A costs,  from t-1 to t. 
Subsample 1 contains firm-year observations with a decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales, 
and increasing SG&A costs. Subsample 2 contains firm-year observations with a decreasing 
SG&A ratio, increasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs. Subsample 3 contains firm-year 
observations with a decreasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs. 
Subsample 4 contains firm-year observations with an increasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales, 
and increasing SG&A costs. Subsample 5 contains firm-year observations with an increasing 
SG&A ratio, decreasing sales, and increasing SG&A costs. Finally, Subsample 6 contains firm-
year observations with an increasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs. 
I then assess the associations between the changes in the SG&A ratio (for each of the six 
subsamples) and changes in future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns.  
I find that partitioning the full sample into these six mutually exclusive subsamples 
provides information about future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns. 
Specifically, I find that increases in the SG&A ratio signal better future performance in 
Subsample 1 (decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales, and increasing SG&A costs) and 
Subsample 6 (increasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs), which is 
counter to the maintained assumption under fundamental analysis – that an increase in the SG&A 
ratio represents decreasing efficiency and is a negative signal. I also find that increases in the 
SG&A ratio signal worse future performance in Subsample 2 (decreasing SG&A ratio, 
increasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs) and Subsample 4 (increasing SG&A ratio, 
increasing sales, and increasing SG&A costs), which supports the assumption from fundamental 
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analysis – that increases in the SG&A ratio are a negative signal. I also find that changes in the 
SG&A ratio are not associated with future performance in Subsample 3 (decreasing SG&A ratio, 
decreasing sales, and decreasing SG&A costs) and Subsample 5 (increasing SG&A ratio, 
decreasing sales, and increasing SG&A costs). Finally, I find that for my three subsamples with 
decreasing sales (Subsample 3, Subsample 5 and Subsample 6), only Subsample 6 has a positive 
association between changes in the SG&A ratio and changes in future performance. These results 
extend Anderson et al. (2007), which finds that increases in the SG&A ratio signal better future 
performance in periods of decreasing sales, by suggesting that not all periods of decreasing sales 
provide the same information about future performance.  
In tests related to analyst forecast revisions, I find that analysts seem to understand the 
information contained in changes in the SG&A ratio and incorporate this information into their 
forecast revisions in only two of my subsamples (Subsample 2 and Subsample 6). In Subsample 
1 and Subsample 4, they do not appear to recognize the information provided by the change in 
the SG&A ratio, and they do not incorporate the information into their forecast revisions. 
Finally, in Subsample 3 and Subsample 5, they appear to make forecast revisions as though there 
is a relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and future performance, but there is no relation 
in these subsamples.  
Finally, I find a negative relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal stock 
returns in Subsample 2, Subsample 3, and Subsample 4, and this relation is subsumed by the 
information contained in forecast revisions only in Subsample 2. I also find a positive relation 
between changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal stock returns in Subsample 1 and Subsample 
6, and neither of these relations are subsumed by the information contained in forecast revisions. 
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In Subsample 5, I find a negative relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal 
stock returns, but only when controlling for forecast revisions. 
This study contributes to the stream of literature on fundamental analysis and SG&A 
costs by performing a more detailed breakdown of changes in the SG&A ratio and by 
demonstrating that this partitioning provides information about changes in future earnings, 
analyst forecast revisions, and future stock returns.  These results should be of interest to 
investors because they reveal that the information content of changes in the SG&A ratio differs 
under different circumstances. Additionally, I demonstrate that changes in the SG&A ratio and 
its components can help to identify firms that will experience higher future earnings and higher 
future stock returns. Finally, my results should be of interest to accounting researchers 
considering the implications of changes in the SG&A ratio and examining the informativeness of 
fundamental signals. 
My paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior evidence from the fundamental 
analysis and SG&A costs literature. Section 3 describes my sample, variable definitions, and 
research design. Section 4 presents my empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
Valuation research focuses on the use of accounting information to estimate firm value. 
According to Lee (1999, 415), “The essential task in valuation is forecasting.” He continues, 
“Fundamental analysis may be viewed as the art of using existing information, such as historical 
statements, to make better forecasts.” Penman (1992, 471) echoes this sentiment when he 
outlines the role of financial statement/fundamental analysis in empirical accounting research by 
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stating, “the task of research is to discover what information projects future earnings and, from a 
financial statement analysis point of view, what information in the financial statement does this.”  
Empirical research attempting to identify relevant financial statement information 
includes Ou and Penman (1989). They identify financial statement attributes that are associated 
with future payoffs and combine them into one “positive-value measure” (Ou and Penman 1989, 
297). Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) extend this idea by identifying candidate fundamentals from 
the written pronouncements of financial analysts. They specifically search the Wall Street 
Journal, Barron’s, Value Line publications on “quality of earnings,” professional commentaries 
on corporate financial reporting and analysis, and newsletters of major securities firms 
commenting on the value-relevance of financial information.
1
 They state that their search 
procedure, which is guided by theory and experts’ judgment, is superior to the statistical search 
method used in Ou and Penman (1989). Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) use nine of the 
fundamentals identified by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and examine whether changes in nine of 
the fundamental signals are informative about subsequent earnings changes. They find that seven 
of the nine signals are significantly related to the one-year-ahead change in earnings. However, 




Anderson et al. (2007) examine this lack of statistical significance between SG&A costs 
and the one-year-ahead change in earnings and offer a possible explanation for this finding. They 
                                                 
1
 The twelve signals they identify are changes in inventory, changes in accounts receivable, 
changes in capital expenditures, changes in research and development, changes in gross margin, 
changes in sales and administrative expenses, changes in provision for doubtful receivables, 
changes in effective tax rate, changes in order backlog, changes in labor force, whether a firm 
uses LIFO or FIFO, and whether a firm has a qualified or unqualified audit opinion.  
2
 Although Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) adopt the variable name “selling and administrative 
expenses (S&A)” from Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), their “S&A” contains the same information 
as my “SG&A.” 
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note that fundamental analysis interprets an increase in the SG&A ratio as a negative signal 
about future profitability and firm value. However, findings in Anderson et al. (2003) point out 
that cost accounting relies on the fundamental assumption that the relation between cost and 
volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases, but this assumption has never been 
empirically tested. They test this idea and find that SG&A costs increase more when sales 
increase than they decrease when sales decrease by an equivalent amount. They label this type of 
cost behavior “sticky,” and find empirical support for the idea that “stickiness” is caused by 
managers recognizing that decreasing sales do not necessarily lead to permanent decreases in 
demand. Managers respond to this by maintaining costs, in the hope that sales rebound. 
Anderson et al. (2007) suggest that these “sticky costs” might offer an explanation for why 
increases in the SG&A ratio are not always a negative signal and why Abarbanell and Bushee 
(1997) find no association between changes in the SG&A ratio and the one-year-ahead change in 
earnings. Anderson et al. (2007) hypothesize that both the stickiness and the fixed nature of some 
costs could cause the SG&A ratio to increase when sales are decreasing. In cases where 
managers maintain costs hoping that sales rebound, an increase in the SG&A ratio might actually 
convey positive information about future performance, in direct contrast to the common 
assumption of fundamental analysis. Anderson et al. (2007) test this hypothesis and find that 
increases in the SG&A ratio when sales decrease signal better future performance.  
This finding – that changes in the SG&A ratio provide different information in different 
circumstances – suggests that a partitioning of changes in the SG&A ratio and its components 
might provide information that signals better projections of future earnings and thus allows for 
more accurate assessments of firm value. Furthermore, by following the methodology in 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) and examining the direct relation between fundamental signals 
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and future earnings, I am able to assess how efficiently analysts use these signals. Finally, I can 
also test for associations between changes in the components of the SG&A ratio and future stock 
returns to determine whether changes in the components of the SG&A ratio convey value-
relevant information beyond the information incorporated by analysts into their forecasts. 
More recent studies in the SG&A costs literature stream include Kama and Weiss (2013), 
which suggests an alternative explanation for firm cost structures. They theorize that when 
managers face incentives to avoid losses and decreases in earnings, or feel pressure to meet or 
beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, they will cut slack resources during times of decreasing sales, 
even if they believe the decrease in sales will be temporary. This decision would lessen the 
degree of cost stickiness, rather than induce it. They test this theory and find that when sales 
decrease, managers cut costs more aggressively in the presence of incentives to avoid losses, to 
avoid decreases in earnings, and to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Similarly, Chen et al. (2012) explore alternative explanations for cost stickiness based on 
managerial incentives. They question whether SG&A costs asymmetry is positively associated 
with the agency problem and whether strong corporate governance mitigates the association. 
They find that cost asymmetry increases with managers’ empire building incentives, and they 
suggest this is an alternative explanation to the sticky cost theory suggested by Anderson et al. 
(2003). Additionally, they find that the positive association between SG&A costs asymmetry and 
the agency problem is mitigated by the presence of strong corporate governance.  
This stream of research suggests a continuing interest in cost structures, sticky costs, 
explanations for the asymmetric response and the information content of changes in the SG&A 
ratio. Additionally, the alternative explanations for cost stickiness suggest that different 
outcomes might arise in different circumstances, in which case, further examination and 
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partitioning of the SG&A costs signal is warranted. My study contributes to the SG&A costs 
literature by re-examining the findings from prior studies over a more recent sample period and 
by exploring firms with increasing versus decreasing SG&A ratios, increasing versus decreasing 
sales, and increasing versus decreasing SG&A costs, to increase our knowledge of the 
information content of changes in the SG&A ratio. 
 
3. Sample, Variable Definitions, and Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
To examine the relation between changes in the components of the SG&A ratio and 
future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns, I first identify all firm-year 
observations from the Compustat database between 1987 and 2011 with sufficient data available 
to calculate all required variables. I eliminate firms in the financial services industry (SIC codes 
6000 to 6999) because of differences in interpreting financial reports between these industries 
and other industries (Subramanyam 1996). Because some variables require data from three years 
prior and one year ahead, I obtain a sample of 38,737 firm-year observations with an actual 
sample period of 1990 to 2010. I obtain forecast data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) for the same sample period, and my sample for tests on analyst forecast 
revisions is 11,030 firm-year observations. Finally, I obtain data from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly files, and my sample for tests on annual stock returns is 
11,929 firm-year observations. I also winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1% of the 
distribution to eliminate extreme observations. I perform the multivariate analyses that follow 
using the maximum number of observations with complete data available for each test. Because 
of this, the number of observations varies across specifications. 
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Table 1 presents historical descriptive statistics for the SG&A ratio over the sample 
period. The full sample of 38,737 firm-year observations has a mean (median) SG&A ratio of 
35.65% (25.21%) for 1990 to 2009, with a low mean (median) of 28.98% (22.41%) in 1994 
(1994) and a high mean (median) of 42.65% (28.91%) in 2002 (2003).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the SG&A ratio by industry. The industry 
classifications are based on the Fama-French 49 Industry Portfolios; however, there are only 46 
industries in my sample because of the elimination of the three industry classifications in the 
financial services sector. The Computer Software industry has the most firm-year observations 
with 3,712, and the Tobacco industry has the least with 53. The highest mean SG&A ratio is 
68.50% for the Pharmaceutical Products industry, and the lowest is 10.46% for the Shipping 
Containers industry. The highest median SG&A ratio is 57.87% for the Computer Software 
industry, and the lowest is 5.83% for the Coal industry.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
For descriptive purposes, and for the multivariate tests that follow, I partition my full 
sample into various subsamples. Table 3 details the composition of these subsamples. I first 
partition  the full sample into subsamples with increasing SG&A ratio (higher in t than in t-1) 
and decreasing SG&A ratio (lower in t than in t-1). The result is a near even split, with 19,316 
firm-year observations with increasing SG&A ratio and 19,421 with decreasing SG&A ratio. 
Next, I partition the full sample into subsamples with increasing sales and decreasing sales. The 
split is approximately two-to-one, with 25,495 firm-year observations with increasing sales and 
13,242 firm-year observations with decreasing sales. This breakdown allows me to replicate tests 
from Anderson et al. (2007) to determine whether the relations they identified are still present 
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over my more recent sample period. The third partition splits the full sample into subsamples 
with increasing levels of SG&A costs and decreasing SG&A costs. The split is also 
approximately two-to-one, with 25,971 firm-year observations with increasing SG&A costs and 
12,766 firm-year observations with decreasing SG&A costs. This breakdown is new to the 
literature stream and is an intermediate step between prior literature specifications and my 
complete breakdown. Finally, I partition  the full sample into six subsamples, based on all 
possible combinations of changes in the SG&A ratio and its components. Subsample 1 is 
composed of 11,552 firm-year observations with decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and 
increasing SG&A costs from t-1 to t. Subsample 2 is composed of 4,359 firm-year observations 
with decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs. Subsample 3 is 
composed of 3,510 firm-year observations with decreasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and 
decreasing SG&A costs. Subsample 4 is composed of 9,584 firm-year observations with 
increasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and increasing SG&A costs. Subsample 5 is composed 
of 4,835 firm-year observations with increasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and increasing 
SG&A costs. Finally, Subsample 6 is composed of 4,897 firm-year observations with increasing 
SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables used in 
the multivariate analyses that follow, for the full sample and all subsamples detailed in Table 3.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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3.3 Empirical Models 
I follow a modified version of the model in Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) and estimate 
the following regressions to examine the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-
year-ahead earnings change (CEPS1i,t) for my various specifications: 
CEPS1i,t = α + β1∆SGA_Ratioi,t + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t  (1) 
CEPS1i,t = α + β2SS_Inc_Salesi,t + β3SS_Dec_Salesi,t + δCEPSi,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (2) 
 
CEPS1i,t = α + β4SS_Inc_SGAi,t + β5SS_Dec_SGAi,t + δCEPSi,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (3) 
 
CEPS1i,t = α + β6SS_1i,t + β7SS_2i,t + β8SS_3i,t + β9SS_4i,t + β10SS_5i,t + β11SS_6i,t  
        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (4) 
 
 Equation (1) is a modified version of the equation used in Abarbanell and Bushee (1997). 
I eliminate the fundamental signals of Audit Qualification, because more than 99% of the 
observations have unqualified audit opinions, and Earnings Quality, because the data source has 
a high variability of number of observations by year, calling into question the reliability of the 
information provided. Equation (1) tests for a direct relation between changes in the SG&A ratio 
and one-year-ahead earnings. If β1 is positive and significant, this suggests that a decrease in the 
SG&A ratio signals better future performance. If β1 is negative and significant, this suggests that 
an increase in the SG&A ratio signals worse future performance. Equation (2) is a modified 
version of the equation used in Anderson et al. (2007) that tests for a relation between changes in 
the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings during periods of increasing sales and periods of 
decreasing sales and allows me determine whether the results in Anderson et al. (2007) still hold 
for my sample period. If β2 is positive and significant, this suggests that a decrease in the SG&A 
ratio signals better future performance in periods of increasing sales. If β2 is negative and 
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significant, this suggests that an increase in the SG&A ratio signals better future performance in 
periods of increasing sales. The coefficient β3 is subject to the same interpretation but in periods 
of decreasing sales. Equation (3) extends prior literature by splitting the sample and testing for a 
relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings during periods of 
increasing SG&A costs levels and periods of decreasing SG&A costs levels. If β4 is positive and 
significant, this suggests that a decrease in the SG&A ratio signals better future performance in 
periods of increasing SG&A costs levels. If β4 is negative and significant, this suggests that an 
increase in the SG&A ratio signals better future performance in periods of increasing SG&A 
costs levels. The coefficient β5 is subject to the same interpretation but in periods of decreasing 
SG&A costs levels. Equation (4) provides my contribution to the literature stream and partitions 
the full sample into subsamples based on all possible combinations of changes in the SG&A ratio 
and its components, to test for a relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead 
earnings during these different types of periods. If β6 is positive (negative) and significant, this 
suggests that an increase in the SG&A ratio signals better (worse) future performance during a 
period of decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and increasing SG&A costs. If β7 is positive 
(negative) and significant, this suggests that an increase in the SG&A ratio signals better (worse) 
future performance during a period of decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and decreasing 
SG&A costs. If β8 is positive (negative) and significant, this suggests that an increase in the 
SG&A ratio signals better (worse) future performance during a period of decreasing SG&A ratio, 
decreasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs. If β9 is positive (negative) and significant, this 
suggests that an increase in the SG&A ratio signals better (worse) future performance during a 
period of increasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and increasing SG&A costs. If β10 is positive 
(negative) and significant, this suggests that an increase in the SG&A ratio signals better (worse) 
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future performance during a period of increasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and increasing 
SG&A costs. Finally, if β11 is positive (negative) and significant, this suggests that an increase in 
the SG&A ratio signals better (worse) future performance during a period of increasing SG&A 
ratio, decreasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs. 
I also estimate the following regressions to examine the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and two-year-ahead earnings change (CEPS2i,t) for my various specifications: 
CEPS2i,t = α + β1∆SGA_Ratioi,t + δCEPS1i,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t  (5) 
CEPS2i,t = α + β2SS_Inc_Salesi,t + β3SS_Dec_Salesi,t + δCEPS1i,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (6) 
 
CEPS2i,t = α + β4SS_Inc_SGAi,t + β5SS_Dec_SGAi,t + δCEPS1i,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (7) 
 
CEPS2i,t = α + β6SS_1i,t + β7SS_2i,t + β8SS_3i,t + β9SS_4i,t + β10SS_5i,t + β11SS_6i,t  
        + δCEPS1i,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (8) 
 
 
The interpretations of the coefficients follow those detailed for Equations (1) through (4), 
with the exception of testing for a relation between changes in the SG&A ratio from period t-1 to 
t and changes in earnings from period t+1 to t+2. This test examines whether any relations 
identified in Equations (1) through (5) are persistent into the subsequent period or whether 
changes in the SG&A ratio between t-1 and t have an effect on future earnings that is not fully 
realized in the first year after the change but becomes apparent in year two. 
I follow a modified version of a model in Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) and estimate the 
following regressions to examine the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and analyst 
forecast revisions (FRi,t) for my various specifications: 
FRi,t = α + β1∆SGA_Ratioi,t + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t   (9) 
FRi,t = α + β2SS_Inc_Salesi,t + β3SS_Dec_Salesi,t + δCEPSi,t  




FRi,t = α + β4SS_Inc_SGAi,t + β5SS_Dec_SGAi,t + δCEPSi,t  
                       +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (11) 
 
FRi,t = α + β6SS_1i,t + β7SS_2i,t + β8SS_3i,t + β9SS_4i,t + β10SS_5i,t + β11SS_6i,t  
+ δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t      (12) 
 
 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) identify the fundamental signals, including SG&A ratio, 
in their models as those that analysts mention as most important when forming their annual 
forecasts. Unless analysts anticipate the information contained in the fundamental signals more 
than one year prior to the realization of the signals, then analyst forecast revisions should be 
related to the fundamentals in the same way they are related to future earnings changes. 
Therefore, if the coefficients are significant in the same direction as the tests examining the 
relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings, this suggests that 
analysts are using the information in the signals when calculating their forecast revisions. 
Alternatively, if the coefficients are significant and in the opposite direction, this suggests that 
analysts are interpreting the signal the opposite of what the new information suggests. If the 
coefficients are insignificant, it suggests that analysts are not using the information in the signals 
when calculating their forecast revisions. 
Finally, I estimate the following regressions to examine the relation between changes in 
the SG&A ratio and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARi,t) for my various specifications: 
BHARi,t = α + β1∆SGA_Ratioi,t + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t   (13) 
BHARi,t = α + β1∆SGA_Ratioi,t + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + β12FRi,t  + εi,t (14) 
BHARi,t = α + β2SS_Inc_Salesi,t + β3SS_Dec_Salesi,t + δCEPSi,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (15) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β2SS_Inc_Salesi,t + β3SS_Dec_Salesi,t + δCEPSi,t  




BHARi,t = α + β4SS_Inc_SGAi,t + β5SS_Dec_SGAi,t + δCEPSi,t  
     +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t       (17) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β4SS_Inc_SGAi,t + β5SS_Dec_SGAi,t + δCEPSi,t  
                +ΣγijOther Signalsij + β12FRi,t  + εi,t     (18) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β6SS_1i,t + β7SS_2i,t + β8SS_3i,t + β9SS_4i,t + β10SS_5i,t + β11SS_6i,t  
      + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (19) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β6SS_1i,t + β7SS_2i,t + β8SS_3i,t + β9SS_4i,t + β10SS_5i,t + β11SS_6i,t  
      + δCEPSi,t  +ΣγijOther Signalsij + β12FRi,t  + εi,t    (20) 
 
By estimating each specification both with and without analyst forecast revisions (FRi,t), I 
can first test whether changes in the SG&A ratio are related to buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
during different types of periods, and I can also test whether investors are relying on analysts to 
properly communicate information contained within the fundamental signals and variables of 
interest. If the coefficients on my variables of interest remain significant in the presence of 
analyst forecast revisions, then this suggests that analysts do not fully impound the information 
contained in these variables, and further suggests that investors recognize this fact.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Relation between Changes in the SG&A Ratio and Future Earnings 
In this section, I examine the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and changes in 
both one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead changes in earnings. Table 6 presents results from 
regressions relating changes in the SG&A ratio to one-year-ahead changes in earnings. Equation 
(1) examines the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings 
changes for all firm-year observations in all types of periods. The coefficient for ΔSGA_Ratio is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio signal 
higher one-year-ahead earnings changes, or in other words, better future performance. This result 
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is not consistent with the customary interpretation of the SG&A signal, which predicts that an 
increasing SG&A ratio should signal worse future performance. I also find significance where 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) do not; however, my sample is much larger and covers a different 
period of time, which could signal a shift in the interpretation of the SG&A ratio is necessary for 
more recent years. Equation (2) examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio have different 
information properties in periods where sales are increasing and periods where sales are 
decreasing. The coefficient on SS_Inc_Sales is not statistically significant, which indicates that 
changes in the SG&A ratio during periods of increasing sales are not associated with one-year-
ahead changes in earnings. However, the coefficient on SS_Dec_Sales is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio during periods of decreasing sales 
signal better future performance. This is consistent with the findings of Anderson et al. (2007). 
Equation (3) examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio have different information properties 
in periods of increasing SG&A costs and periods of decreasing SG&A costs. The coefficient on 
SS_Inc_SG&A is not statistically significant, which indicates that changes in the SG&A ratio 
during periods of increasing SG&A costs are not associated with one-year-ahead changes in 
earnings. The coefficient on SS_Dec_SG&A is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio signal better future performance in periods of 
decreasing SG&A costs. Finally, Equation (4) examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio 
have different information properties during periods with different combinations of changes in 
the SG&A ratio, sales, and SG&A costs, as represented by my six subsamples. The coefficient 
on SS_1 is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that increases in the SG&A ratio 
are associated with higher one-year-ahead changes in earnings in periods where the SG&A ratio 
is decreasing, and both sales and SG&A costs are increasing. Once again, this is contradictory to 
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the general interpretation of the SG&A ratio in fundamental analysis. The coefficient on SS_2 is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that increases in the SG&A ratio are 
associated with lower one-year-ahead changes in earnings during periods of decreasing SG&A 
ratio, increasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs. This finding is important, given that tests of 
periods split solely into increasing and decreasing sales find no association between changes in 
the SG&A ratio and future earnings, during periods of increasing sales. My results indicate that 
although periods of increasing sales alone do not provide statistically significant information 
about future earnings, the partitioning of increasing sales periods into those with increasing and 
decreasing SG&A costs does provide new information. While it is not surprising that periods of 
increasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs signal better future performance, this has not been 
documented in prior research. The coefficient on SS_3 is not statistically significant, indicating 
that changes in the SG&A ratio during periods where the SG&A ratio, sales and SG&A costs are 
all decreasing, are not associated with one-year-ahead earnings change. The results of these three 
periods suggest that the presumption in fundamental analysis that decreases in the SG&A ratio 
represent “increasing efficiency,” and therefore signal better future performance, is incorrect. 
The coefficient on SS_4 is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that increases in 
the SG&A ratio are associated with lower one-year-ahead changes in earnings during periods 
where the SG&A ratio, sales and SG&A costs are all increasing. The coefficients on SS_5 is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that changes in the SG&A ratio during periods of increasing 
SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and increasing SG&A costs are not associated with one-year-ahead 
earnings change. Finally, the coefficient on SS_6 is positive and significant at 1% level, 
indicating that increases in the SG&A ratio are associated with higher one-year-ahead changes in 
earnings during periods of increasing SG&A ratio, decreasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs. 
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While the results presented for tests of periods of decreasing sales alone were consistent with the 
findings of Anderson et al. (2007), this full partitioning suggests that the results are being driven 
by periods of decreasing sales that also exhibit increasing SG&A ratio and decreasing SG&A 
costs. Or, in other words, periods where both sales and SG&A costs are decreasing, but sales are 
decreasing more, which is reasonably explained by the concept of cost stickiness. On the other 
hand, if sales are decreasing while SG&A costs are increasing or if SG&A costs are decreasing 
more than sales, there is no statistical expectation of better future performance.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 7 presents results from regressions relating changes in the SG&A ratio to two-year-
ahead changes in earnings. These tests will allow me to determine whether any relations 
identified in Equations (1) through (4) are persistent into the subsequent period. Equation (5) 
examines the overall relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and two-year-ahead changes in 
earnings. The coefficient on ΔSGA_Ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that increases in the SG&A ratio signal higher two-year-ahead earnings changes, or in other 
words, better future performance. This is consistent with the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead changes in earnings, suggesting that this effect persists for at 
least two years. Equation (6) examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio have different 
information properties in periods where sales are increasing and periods where sales are 
decreasing. The coefficient on SS_Inc_Sales is not statistically significant, while the coefficient 
on SS_Dec_Sales is positive and significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the 
one-year-ahead results, suggesting that both effects persist for at least two years. Equation (7) 
examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio have different information properties in periods of 
increasing SG&A costs and periods of decreasing SG&A costs. The coefficient on 
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SS_Inc_SG&A is positive and significant at the 5% level, but the coefficient on SS_Dec_SG&A 
is not statistically significant. These results are flipped from the tests of one-year-ahead earnings, 
suggesting that a relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and future earnings in periods of 
increasing SG&A costs does not appear until year two, and the association in periods of 
decreasing SG&A costs only exists in year one and does not persist into year two. Finally, 
Equation (8) examines whether changes in the SG&A ratio have different information properties 
during periods with different combinations of changes in sales and SG&A costs, as represented 
by my six subsamples. The coefficients on SS_1, SS_2, SS_3 and SS_6 are all consistent with the 
associations identified on one-year-ahead earnings changes, indicating that the relations 
identified in year one persist at least into year two. However, the coefficient on SS_4 is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the effects of changes in the SG&A ratio do not persist 
into year two. Finally, the coefficient on SS_5 is positive and significant at the 5% level, despite 
the fact that there was no relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead 
earnings change. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2 The Relation between Changes in the SG&A Ratio and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
In this section, I examine whether changes in the SG&A ratio are associated with analyst 
forecast revisions in the same way they are related to changes in future earnings. If analysts are 
using the information provided by the change in the SG&A ratio, then this symmetry will exist. 
Table 8 presents results from regressions relating changes in the SG&A ratio to one-year-ahead 
analyst forecast revisions. Equation (9) examines the overall relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and forecast revisions. The coefficient on ΔSGA_Ratio is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. This is consistent with the association between changes in the SG&A ratio and 
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one-year-ahead earnings changes, suggesting that analysts are correctly interpreting the signal 
and efficiently incorporating it into their forecast revisions. Equation (10) examines the relation 
in periods where sales are increasing and periods where sales are decreasing. The coefficients on 
SS_Inc_Sales and SS_Dec_Sales are statistically insignificant and positive and significant at the 
1% level, respectively. This is also consistent with the association between the changes in the 
SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead changes in earnings for SS_Inc_Sales and SS_Dec_Sales. Once 
again, analysts are correctly interpreting the signal and incorporating the information into their 
forecast revisions. Equation (11) examines the relation in periods of increasing SG&A costs and 
periods of decreasing SG&A costs. The coefficient on SS_Inc_SG&A is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, and the coefficient on SS_Dec_SG&A is statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient on SS_Inc_SG&A suggests that analysts believe the signal is providing information, 
when tests for one-year-ahead earnings changes suggest there is not. Additionally, the coefficient 
on SS_Dec_SG&A suggests that they do not understand the information contained in the signal 
and fail to utilize it in their revisions. Finally, Equation (12) examines the relation between 
changes in the SG&A ratio and analyst forecast revisions during periods with different 
combinations of changes in the SG&A ratio, sales and SG&A costs, as represented by my six 
subsamples. The coefficients on SS_2 and SS_6 are consistent with the results from the tests on 
one-year-ahead earnings changes, suggesting that analysts correctly interpret the signals and 
incorporate the information into their forecast revisions for these two subsamples. The 
coefficients on SS_1 and SS_4 are statistically insignificant, which is inconsistent with the 
coefficients from the test on change in earnings, suggesting that analysts do not understand that 
the signals in these subsamples are providing information, and they do not incorporate the 
information into their revisions. Finally, the coefficients on SS_3 and SS_5 are negative and 
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significant at the 1% level and positive and significant at the 1% level, respectively, despite the 
fact that tests on changes in earnings for these two subsamples indicate no association. This 
suggests that analysts incorrectly believe the signals are providing information, when they are 
not, and making forecast revisions based on this faulty belief.  
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
4.3 The Relation between Changes in the SG&A Ratio and Stock Returns 
In this section, I examine whether changes in the SG&A ratio are associated with 12-
month buy-and-hold abnormal returns. I run each regression twice, first with my variable(s) of 
interest and the fundamental signals, and then again with my variable(s) of interest, the 
fundamental signals and analyst forecast revisions. The first specification examines whether 
changes in efficiency are related to stock returns, and the second specification examines whether 
any associations hold in the presence of the forecast revisions or whether they are subsumed by 
the revisions. Table 9 presents results from regressions relating changes in the SG&A ratio to 
buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns. Equation (13) examines the overall relation between 
changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal returns. The coefficient on ΔSGA_Ratio is statistically 
insignificant, indicating that changes in the SG&A ratio are not related to abnormal returns. 
However, in Equation (14), the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that increases in the SG&A ratio signal lower abnormal returns when controlling for forecast 
revisions, which also have a positive and significant coefficient. Equations (15) and (16) 
examine the relation in periods where sales are increasing and periods where sales are 
decreasing. The coefficient on SS_Inc_Sales is negative and significant at the 5% level in both 
equations, suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio signal lower abnormal returns in periods 
of increasing sales. The coefficient on SS_Dec_Sales is statistically insignificant in both 
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equations, suggesting that changes in the SG&A ratio are not related to abnormal returns in 
periods of decreasing sales. Equations (16) and (17) examine the relation in periods of increasing 
SG&A costs and periods of decreasing SG&A costs. The coefficient on SS_Inc_SG&A is 
negative and significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, suggesting that increases in the 
SG&A ratio signal lower abnormal returns in periods of increasing SG&A costs. The coefficient 
on SS_Dec_SG&A is statistically insignificant in both equations, suggesting that changes in the 
SG&A ratio are not related to abnormal returns in periods of decreasing SG&A costs. Finally, 
Equations (19) and (20) examine the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal 
returns during periods with different combinations of changes in efficiency, sales and SG&A 
costs, as represented by my six subsamples. The coefficients on SS_1 and SS_6 are positive and 
significant for both Equation (19) and Equation (20), suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio 
signal higher abnormal returns in periods when the SG&A ratio is decreasing, sales are 
increasing and SG&A costs are increasing and when the SG&A ratio is increasing, sales are 
decreasing and SG&A costs are decreasing, and the relations are not subsumed by the 
information contained in forecast revisions. The coefficients on SS_3 and SS_4 are negative and 
significant for both Equation (19) and Equation (20), suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio 
lead to lower abnormal returns in periods when the SG&A ratio, sales and SG&A costs are either 
all increasing or all decreasing, and the relations are not subsumed by the information contained 
in the forecast revisions. The coefficient on SS_2 is negative and significant at the 5% level for 
Equation (19) but not statistically significant for Equation (20). This suggests that the apparent 
negative relationship between changes in the SG&A ratio and abnormal returns in periods of 
decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales and decreasing SG&A costs are actually due to the 
information contained in analyst forecast revisions. Finally, the coefficient on SS_5 is 
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statistically insignificant for Equation (19) but negative and significant at the 5% level for 
Equation (20), suggesting that increases in the SG&A ratio signal lower abnormal returns in 
periods with increases in the SG&A ratio, decreases in sales and increases in SG&A costs when 
controlling for forecast revisions. 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
4.4 Additional Tests 
 Anderson et al. (2007) hypothesize that because cost stickiness causes an increase in the 
SG&A ratio in years with decreasing sales, the influence of these sticky costs will be higher in 
periods where the SG&A ratio is higher. I examine whether the relation between future earnings 
and changes in the SG&A ratio are more pronounced when the ratio is higher by partitioning 
each of my six subsamples into two groups. The first group contains firm-year observations that 
are below the median SG&A ratio for the respective subsample, and the second group is the 
firm-year observations above the median. I estimate the following regression to examine the 
relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings change (CEPS1i,t) for 
firm-year observations with lower and higher SG&A ratios for each subsample: 
CEPS1i,t = α + β13SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t + β14SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β15SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β16SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β17SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t + β18SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β19SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t + β20SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β21SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β22SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t   
        + β23SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β24SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t 
        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (21) 
 
 If the hypothesis in Anderson et al. (2007) is correct, then I should find positive and 
significant coefficients for β18, β22 and β24, which represent the firm-year observations with 
SG&A ratios above the median for the three subsamples with decreasing sales. The coefficients 
for β17, β21 and β23, which represent the firm-year observations with SG&A ratios below the 
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median for the three subsamples with decreasing sales, should either be statistically insignificant 
or have smaller coefficients, if the hypothesis is true. Additionally, if observations with higher 
SG&A ratios are driving the results during periods of increasing sales, I should find more 
significant results for coefficients β14, β16 and β20 than for coefficients β13, β15 and β19.  
 Inconsistent with the prediction of Anderson et al. (2007), out of the three subsamples 
with decreasing sales, I only find a positive and significant coefficient on β24. However, the 
coefficient on β23 is also positive and significant and has a larger coefficient than β24 (0.1765 vs. 
0.0016). Previous tests indicate that there is no statistically significant relation between changes 
in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings change for Subsample 3, but I find that when 
bifurcating the subsample into higher and lower SG&A ratio the firm-year observations above 
the median have a negative and significant coefficient, which is opposite the prediction of 
Anderson et al. (2007). Additionally, the coefficients for high and low ratio on Subsample 5 (β21 
and β22) are both statistically insignificant, which also lends no support to the hypothesis. When 
examining the relation during periods of increasing sales, I only find the results being driven by 
observations with higher SG&A ratios in Subsample 2 (decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing sales 
and decreasing SG&A costs). The coefficient on β16 is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level, while the coefficient on β15 is statistically insignificant, indicating that an increasing 
SG&A ratio signals worse future performance, but only for the observations in Subsample 2 that 
have SG&A ratios above the median. For Subsample 1 and Subsample 4, the results are actually 
driven by observations with SG&A ratios below the median. The coefficient on β13 is positive 
and significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on β14 is insignificant, suggesting that 
the positive relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead changes in 
earnings, during periods where the SG&A ratio is increasing and both sales and SG&A costs are 
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increasing, is attributable to firm-year observations with SG&A ratios below the median for the 
subsample. Similarly, the coefficient on β19 is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, 
while the coefficient on β20 is insignificant, suggesting that the negative relation between changes 
in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead changes in earnings, during periods where SG&A ratio, 
sales and SG&A costs are all increasing, is attributable to firm-year observations with SG&A 
ratios below the median for the subsample. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
I also estimate the following regression to examine the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and two-year-ahead earnings change (CEPS2i,t) for firm-year observations with 
lower and higher SG&A ratios for each subsample: 
CEPS2i,t = α + β13SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t + β14SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β15SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β16SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β17SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t + β18SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β19SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t + β20SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β21SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β22SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t   
        + β23SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β24SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t 
        + δCEPS1i,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (22) 
 
This test examines whether any relations identified in Equation (21) are persistent into 
the subsequent period or whether changes in the SG&A ratio, split at the median of the ratio 
itself, between t-1 and t have an effect on future earnings that is not fully realized in the first year 
after the change but becomes apparent in year two. For Subsample 1, Subsample 2, Subsample 3 
and Subsample 6, the relations identified by Equation (21) all hold, indicating a persistence 
lasting at least two years. For Subsample 4 and Subsample 5, the relations identified by Equation 
(21) for the observations with SG&A ratios below the median both persist into year two; 
however, the two statistically insignificant coefficients for the observations with SG&A ratios 
above the median in year one become positive and significant in year two tests. This suggests 
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that increases in the SG&A ratio do lead to better future performance for observations with 
higher SG&A ratios in these two subsamples, but the effects do not become apparent until year 
two. Additionally, this adds some additional support to the hypothesis of Anderson et al. (2007) 
given that Subsample 4 is composed of firms with decreasing sales.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
I also estimate the following regression to examine the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and analyst forecast revisions (FRi,t) for firm-year observations with lower and 
higher SG&A ratios for each subsample: 
FRi,t = α + β13SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t + β14SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β15SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β16SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β17SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t + β18SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β19SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t + β20SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t  
        + β21SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β22SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t   
        + β23SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β24SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t 
        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (23) 
 
The test will examine whether analysts are using the information in the signals identified 
in Equation (21) when calculating their forecast revisions. If the coefficients are statistically 
significant in the same direction as the results from Equation (21) it indicates that analysts are 
able to interpret the signals correctly in the various subsamples for firm-years with ratios above 
and below the median and that they are utilizing the information in the signals when revising 
their forecasts. For Subsample 1, Subsample 2 and Subsample 4, all coefficients are consistent 
with the results from Equation (21), indicating that analysts understand the implications of 
changes in the SG&A ratio for these subsamples and incorporate the information into their 
forecast revisions. Interestingly, these are the three subsamples that represent all firm-year 
observations with increasing sales, suggesting that analysts are particularly good at interpreting 
the signals when sales are increasing. For Subsample 3, analysts seem to understand the signal 
29 
 
for observations with SG&A ratios above the median, but they also make forecast revisions for 
firms below the median in the same manner, even though the results from tests of one-year-ahead 
earnings suggest there is no statistically significant information provided by these signals. For 
Subsamples 5 and 6, analysts appear to completely misinterpret the signals. In particular, they 
make forecast revisions for both partitions of Subsample 5 as if the signal contains information, 
when it does not, and they ignore the information provided by the signals in Subsample 6, failing 
to incorporate it into their revisions. The three subsamples where they do not fully understand the 
signals represent all periods of decreasing sales. This might not be a surprising result, in light of 
the results of Anderson et al. (2007), who find a positive relation between changes in the SG&A 
ratio and future performance. Their finding is the opposite of the prediction of fundamental 
analysis, and it appears that analysts may still subscribe to the beliefs of this type of analysis and 
do not understand the true meaning of the signals during periods of decreasing sales. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
Finally, I estimate the following regressions to examine the relation between changes in 
the SG&A ratio and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARi,t) for firm-year observations with 
lower and higher SG&A ratios for each subsample: 
BHARi,t = α + β13SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t + β14SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β15SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β16SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β17SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t + β18SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β19SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t + β20SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β21SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β22SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t   
+ β23SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β24SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t 
+ δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t      (24) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β13SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t + β14SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β15SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β16SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β17SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t + β18SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β19SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t + β20SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t  
+ β21SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β22SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t   
+ β23SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t  + β24SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t 
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By estimating each specification both with and without analyst forecast revisions (FRi,t), I 
can first test whether changes in the SG&A ratio are related to buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
for my various subsamples partitioned into firm-year observations below and above the median 
SG&A ratio, and I can also test whether investors are relying on analysts to properly 
communicate information contained within the fundamental signals and variables of interest. If 
the coefficients on my variables of interest remain significant in the presence of analyst forecast 
revisions, then this suggests that analysts do not fully impound the information contained in 
these variables, and further suggests that investors recognize this fact. For Subsample 1, I find 
that changes in the SG&A ratio are positively related to future stock returns for firm-year 
observations both above and below the median, but this relation is subsumed by forecast 
revisions for only those observations with SG&A ratios above the median. For Subsample 2, I 
find that changes in the SG&A ratio are negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year 
observations above the median, but are not related to returns for firms below the median. 
However the relation for observations above the median is subsumed by forecast revisions. For 
Subsample 3, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are negatively related to future stock returns 
for firm-year observations both above and below the median, and neither of these relations are 
subsumed by forecast revisions. For Subsample 4, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are 
negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year observations both above and below the 
median, but this relation is subsumed by forecast revisions for only those observations with 
SG&A ratios above the median. For Subsample 5, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are 
negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year observations above the median, but are 
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not related to returns for firms below the median. The relation for observations above the median 
is not subsumed by forecast revisions. For Subsample 6, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio 
are positively related to future stock returns for firm-year observations above the median, but are 
not related to returns for firms below the median. The relation for observations above the median 
is not subsumed by forecast revisions. 
 [Insert Table 13 here] 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
Next, I examine whether the relation between future earnings and changes in the SG&A 
ratio are more pronounced when the change in the SG&A ratio is higher by partitioning each of 
my six subsamples into two groups. The first group contains firm-year observations that are 
larger than the median change in the SG&A ratio for the respective subsample, and the second 
group is the firm-year observations smaller than the median. For Subsamples 1, 2 and 3, the first 
group is partitioned into smaller changes (less decreasing) and larger changes (more decreasing). 
For Subsamples 4, 5 and 6, the first group is smaller changes (less increasing) and larger changes 
(more increasing). This test will determine whether more extreme changes in the SG&A ratio are 
responsible for the results of previous tests, or whether less extreme changes are just as 
informative in their signals about future performance. I estimate the following regression to 
examine the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead earnings change 
(CEPS1i,t) for firm-year observations with smaller and larger changes in the SG&A ratio for each 
subsample: 
CEPS1i,t = α + β25SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t + β26SS_1_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β27SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t  + β28SS_2_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β29SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t + β30SS_3_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β31SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t + β32SS_4_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β33SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t  + β34SS_5_Larger_Changei,t   
        + β35SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t  + β36SS_6_Larger_Changei,t 
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        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (26) 
 
 If observations with larger changes in the SG&A ratio are driving the results, then I 
should see more significant results for coefficients β26, β28, β30, β32, β34 and β36 than for 
coefficients β25, β27, β29, β31, β33 and β35. For Subsample 1, both the smaller and larger change 
samples are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, which is also consistent with the 
results when the subsample is not partitioned. Although both are statistically significant, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the partition with the smaller change in the SG&A ratio 
(1.7442) than the partition with the larger change (0.2008), suggesting that the smaller change 
partition has a greater impact on the results without partitioning. For Subsample 2, the smaller 
change sample is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, while the larger change sample 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The negative and significant result is consistent 
with the result from the non-partitioned test, suggesting that the observations with larger changes 
in the SG&A ratio are driving the results during periods of decreasing SG&A ratio, increasing 
sales and decreasing SG&A costs. For Subsample 3, the partition for smaller change is negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level, while the partition for larger change is not statistically 
significant. The results for the non-partitioned test were also not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the partition for larger change is driving the results and masking the informative 
signal contained in the firm-year observations with smaller changes in the SG&A ratio during 
periods where the SG&A ratio, sales and SG&A costs are all decreasing. For Subsample 4, the 
smaller change sample is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, while the larger change 
sample is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The negative and significant result is 
consistent with the result from the non-partitioned test. Although both are statistically significant, 
the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the partition with the smaller change in the SG&A 
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ratio (-2.1925) than the partition with the larger change (-0.0295), suggesting that the smaller 
change partition has a greater impact on the results without partitioning. For Subsample 5, the 
partition for smaller change is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, while the partition 
for larger change is not statistically significant. The results for the non-partitioned test were also 
not statistically significant, suggesting that the partition for larger change is driving the results 
and masking the informative signal contained in the firm-year observations with smaller changes 
in the SG&A ratio during periods where the SG&A ratio is increasing, sales are decreasing and 
SG&A costs are increasing. Subsample 3 and Subsample 5 both contain observations with 
decreasing sales, which was the focus of Anderson et al. (2007). Although non-partitioned results 
in my study suggest that their results are driven by observations in periods when the SG&A ratio 
is increasing and both sales and SG&A costs are decreasing, it also appears that observations in 
my Subsamples 3 and 5 with less extreme changes in the SG&A ratio actually produce results 
opposite of the findings in Anderson et al. (2007). For Subsample 6, both the smaller and larger 
change samples are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, which is also consistent with 
the results when the subsample is not partitioned. Although both are statistically significant, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the partition with the smaller change in the SG&A ratio 
(0.5981) than the partition with the larger change (0.0016), suggesting that the smaller change 
partition has a greater impact on the results without partitioning. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
I also estimate the following regression to examine the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and two-year-ahead earnings change (CEPS2i,t) for firm-year observations with 
smaller and larger changes in the SG&A ratios for each subsample: 
CEPS2i,t = α + β25SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t + β26SS_1_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β27SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t  + β28SS_2_Larger_Changei,t  
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        + β29SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t + β30SS_3_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β31SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t + β32SS_4_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β33SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t  + β34SS_5_Larger_Changei,t   
        + β35SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t  + β36SS_6_Larger_Changei,t 
        + δCEPS1i,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (27) 
 
This test examines whether any relations identified in Equation (26) are persistent into 
the subsequent period or whether relations with future earnings not present in the first year 
become apparent in year two. For Subsample 1, the relations identified by Equation (26) hold, 
indicating a persistence lasting at least two years during periods of decreasing SG&A ratio and 
increases in both sales and SG&A costs. For Subsample 2, the relation identified by Equation 
(26) for the observations with larger changes in the SG&A ratio persists into year two; however, 
the positive and significant coefficient for the observations with smaller changes in the SG&A 
ratio in year one become statistically insignificant in year two tests. For Subsample 3, the 
negative and significant relation identified by Equation (26) for the observations with smaller 
changes in the SG&A ratio becomes statistically insignificant in year two. Additionally, the 
coefficient on the partition with the larger change in the SG&A ratio that was statistically 
insignificant remains the same in year two. For Subsample 4, the negative and significant 
relation identified by Equation (26) for the observations with smaller changes in the SG&A ratio 
persists into year two; however, the negative and significant coefficient for the observations with 
larger changes in the SG&A ratio in year one become statistically insignificant in year two tests. 
For Subsample 5, the negative and significant relation identified by Equation (26) for the 
observations with smaller changes in the SG&A ratio becomes statistically insignificant in year 
two, indicating that the effect does no persist. Additionally, the statistically insignificant 
coefficient for the observations with larger changes in the SG&A ratio in year one become 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level in year two, suggesting that the effect does not 
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become apparent until the second year in periods where the SG&A ratio and SG&A costs are 
increasing and sales are decreasing and changes in the SG&A are more extreme. For Subsample 
6, the positive and significant relation identified by Equation (26) for the observations with 
smaller changes in the SG&A ratio persists into year two; however, the positive and significant 
coefficient for the observations with larger changes in the SG&A ratio in year one become 
statistically insignificant in year two tests. 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
I also estimate the following regression to examine the relation between changes in the 
SG&A ratio and analyst forecast revisions (FRi,t) for firm-year observations with smaller and 
larger changes in the SG&A ratio for each subsample: 
FRi,t = α + β25SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t + β26SS_1_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β27SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t  + β28SS_2_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β29SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t + β30SS_3_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β31SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t + β32SS_4_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β33SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t  + β34SS_5_Larger_Changei,t   
        + β35SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t  + β36SS_6_Larger_Changei,t 
        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (28) 
 
The test will examine whether analysts are using the information in the signals identified 
in Equation (26) when calculating their forecast revisions. If the coefficients are statistically 
significant in the same direction as the results from Equation (26) it indicates that analysts are 
able to interpret the signals correctly in the various subsamples for firm-years with smaller and 
larger changes in the SG&A ratio and that they are utilizing the information in the signals when 
revising their forecasts. From Equation (26), I obtain significant results for ten out of the twelve 
samples when examining the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and one-year-ahead 
earnings changes; however, results from Equation (28) indicate that analysts only interpret the 
signal correctly in five out of twelve samples. This suggests that analysts do not fully understand 
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that the magnitude of the change in the SG&A ratio plays an important role in predicting future 
performance. For Subsample 1, analysts correctly revise their forecasts upward as the ratio 
increases for the smaller change sample, but they do not seem to understand that the signal for 
the larger change partition also contains information, and they do not incorporate this 
information into their forecast revisions. For Subsample 2, analysts understand the implications 
of changes in the SG&A ratio for the larger change partition and revise their forecasts 
accordingly, but they do not revise their forecasts for the smaller change sample, even though 
Equation (26) indicates that the signal provides information. For Subsample 3, analysts revise 
their forecasts down as the SG&A ratio increases for both partitions, which is the correct 
interpretation for the smaller change sample, but Equation (26) indicates that the signal for the 
larger change sample does not actually contain information, and analysts behave as though it 
does provide information. For Subsample 4, Equation (26) indicates a negative and significant 
relation for both smaller and larger changes, but analysts only revise their forecasts accordingly 
for the smaller change partition, and they do not correctly interpret the signal for the larger 
change sample. For Subsample 5, analysts do not revise their forecasts for the smaller change 
sample, even though Equation (26) indicates they should, and they do revise their forecasts for 
the larger change partition, when results from tests on one-year-ahead earnings changes are 
statistically insignificant. For Subsample 6, Equation (26) suggests that analysts should be 
revising their forecasts upward with increases in the SG&A ratio for both the smaller and larger 
change samples, but they only understand the signal and revise correctly for the larger change 
partition and appear to ignore the information provided by the signal for the smaller change 
sample. Overall, the results from this test suggest that analysts do not do a very good job of 
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interpreting the relation between changes in the SG&A ratio and changes in future earnings when 
the ratio changes are partitioned by their magnitude. 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
Finally, I estimate the following regressions to examine the relation between changes in 
the SG&A ratio and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARi,t) for firm-year observations with 
smaller and larger changes in the SG&A ratio for each subsample: 
BHARi,t = α + β25SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t + β26SS_1_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β27SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t  + β28SS_2_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β29SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t + β30SS_3_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β31SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t + β32SS_4_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β33SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t  + β34SS_5_Larger_Changei,t   
        + β35SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t  + β36SS_6_Larger_Changei,t 
        + δCEPSi,t +ΣγijOther Signalsij + εi,t     (29) 
 
BHARi,t = α + β25SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t + β26SS_1_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β27SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t  + β28SS_2_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β29SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t + β30SS_3_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β31SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t + β32SS_4_Larger_Changei,t  
        + β33SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t  + β34SS_5_Larger_Changei,t   
        + β35SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t  + β36SS_6_Larger_Changei,t 




By estimating each specification both with and without analyst forecast revisions (FRi,t), I 
can first test whether changes in the SG&A ratio are related to buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
for my various subsamples partitioned into firm-year observations with smaller and larger 
changes in the SG&A ratio, and I can also test whether investors are relying on analysts to 
properly communicate information contained within the fundamental signals and variables of 
interest. If the coefficients on my variables of interest remain significant in the presence of 
analyst forecast revisions, then this suggests that analysts do not fully impound the information 
contained in these variables, and further suggests that investors recognize this fact. For 
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Subsample 1, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are positively related to future stock returns 
for firm-year observations with both smaller and larger changes in the ratio, and this relation is 
not subsumed by forecast revisions for either of the partitions. For Subsample 2, I find that 
changes in the SG&A ratio are negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year 
observations with both smaller and larger changes in the ratio, but this relation is subsumed by 
forecast revisions for the sample with larger changes in the SG&A ratio. For Subsample 3, I find 
that changes in the SG&A ratio are negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year 
observations with both smaller and larger changes in the ratio, and neither of these relations are 
subsumed by forecast revisions. For Subsample 4, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are 
negatively related to future stock returns for firm-year observations with larger changes in the 
SG&A ratio but are not related to future stock returns for observations with smaller changes. 
Additionally, the relation for observations with larger changes is not subsumed by forecast 
revisions. For Subsample 5, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are not related to future stock 
returns for firm-year observations with either smaller or larger changes in the ratio, but are 
negatively and significantly related for the observations with larger changes when controlling for 
forecast revisions. For Subsample 6, I find that changes in the SG&A ratio are positively related 
to future stock returns for firm-year observations with both smaller and larger changes in the 
ratio, and neither of these relations are subsumed by forecast revisions. 
 [Insert Table 18 here] 
 






Fundamental analysis suggests that increases in the SG&A ratio represent decreases in 
efficiency and are indications that managers are not able to adequately control costs. 
Furthermore, this lack of control is a negative signal regarding future performance and firm 
value. Alternatively, decreases in the SG&A ratio are viewed as increases in efficiency and are a 
sign that managers are properly controlling costs. Therefore, this decrease is believed to be a 
positive signal regarding future performance and firm value.  
In early empirical research, Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) examine the relation between 
changes in efficiency and one-year-ahead changes in earnings and find a statistically 
insignificant association. Anderson et al. (2007) draw on the earlier work in Anderson et al. 
(2003) that demonstrates SG&A costs do not decrease as much when revenue decreases as they 
increase when revenue increases and hypothesize that this could be the reason Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1997) do not find results. They test this theory and find that increases in the SG&A ratio 
signal higher future earnings during times of increasing sales and lower future earnings during 
times of decreasing sales. The partitioning of the full sample into periods of increasing and 
decreasing sales creates a new set of signals from the change in efficiency that is incrementally 
informative about changes in future earnings. Additionally, the results raise the possibility that 
increases in the SG&A ratio do not always represent loss of control over costs and a decline in 
efficiency, and likewise, a decrease in the SG&A ratio does not necessarily indicate better future 
performance. This suggests that a further partitioning of the SG&A ratio into finer changes in 
components may also provide additional information about future performance and firm value. 
In this study, I identify subsamples of firm-years representing all possible combinations of 
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changes in the SG&A ratio and its components, and I examine whether these changes provide 
information about future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and future stock returns.   
I find that the expectations of fundamental analysis, as they relate to changes in the 
SG&A ratio, do not always hold true. In fact, when I examine three different combinations of 
observations with decreases in the SG&A ratio, only one signals better future performance. 
Additionally, one of the sets of observations with increases in the SG&A ratio signal better 
future performance, which is also opposite the prediction of fundamental analysis. However, this 
does support the results of Anderson et al. (2007) who find that increases in the SG&A ratio 
signal better future performance in periods of decreasing sales, but also provides incremental 
informativeness by demonstrating that this only holds in periods when the SG&A ratio is 
increasing, sales are decreasing, and SG&A costs are decreasing. Additionally, I find that 
analysts understand the signal contained in changes in the SG&A ratio and incorporate the 
information into their forecast revisions for only two of my six subsamples. In the other four 
subsamples, they either incorrectly interpret the signal and do not incorporate it into their 
revisions, or they create revisions as though the signal contained information, when it does not. 
Finally, I find that in five of my six subsamples, the change in the SG&A ratio is statistically 
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Observations   
Mean 
SG&A 




       Agriculture 
 










655  28.93% 
 
27.83% 
Automobiles and Trucks 
 
774  18.78% 
 
12.80% 
Beer & Liquor 
 










656  17.00% 
 
14.76% 
Candy & Soda 
 











































































511  31.98% 
 
24.58% 
Machinery  1,506  28.72%  22.58% 
Measuring and Control Equipment  1,030  48.06%  39.52% 
Medical Equipment  1,341  64.15%  49.77% 
Miscellaneous  854  44.41%  26.90% 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining  323  24.22%  9.29% 
Personal Services  432  32.98%  27.72% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  2,963  25.35%  12.04% 
Pharmaceutical Products  1,571  68.50%  50.76% 
Precious Metals  396  22.86%  12.80% 
Printing and Publishing  362  36.32%  34.02% 
Recreation  380  40.25%  30.69% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels  669  17.28%  11.03% 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
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Machinery  16.33%  32.00%  23.89% 
Measuring and Control Equipment  29.60%  52.45%  31.72% 
Medical Equipment  35.60%  77.73%  41.12% 
Miscellaneous  14.90%  49.40%  45.23% 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining  5.49%  17.86%  39.79% 
Personal Services  14.28%  47.94%  23.42% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  6.42%  24.01%  35.54% 
Pharmaceutical Products  34.89%  93.94%  45.94% 
Precious Metals  7.95%  21.05%  32.01% 
Printing and Publishing  25.25%  41.90%  19.60% 
Recreation  22.23%  40.14%  34.33% 
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Mean 
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       Retail 
 
2,388  28.44% 
 
25.88% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 
 
419  22.80% 
 
18.79% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 
 





123  10.46% 
 
9.62% 
Steel Works Etc 
 

























1,570  22.88% 
 
18.52% 
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TABLE 3 - Panel A 







Increasing SG&A Ratio 
Subsample 
Decreasing SG&A Ratio 
Subsample 





   SG&A 
Costs 
   












     SG&A 
Ratio 
    Sales + - 

























TABLE 3 - Panel B 




Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3 
    SG&A Ratio - - - 
Sales + + - 
SG&A Costs + - - 




Subsample 4 Subsample 5 Subsample 6 
  
  
SG&A Ratio + + + 
Sales + - - 
SG&A Costs + + - 
  
  
N 9,584 4,835 4,897 
55 
 
TABLE 4 - Panel A 








    CEPS 0.082 -0.002 0.165 
CEPS1 0.057 0.066 0.047 
CEPS2 0.032 0.037 0.027 
FR 0.109 0.105 0.113 
BHAR -0.022 -0.025 -0.019 
SG&A Ratio 0.357 0.374 0.339 
ΔSG&A Ratio 0.173 0.494 -0.146 
Sales 2035.010 2076.800 1993.450 
ΔSales 93.170 46.974 139.116 
SG&A 306.099 329.492 282.834 
ΔSG&A 18.443 25.073 11.849 
INV 203.825 216.407 191.310 
ΔINV -0.003 0.008 -0.013 
AR 316.753 318.456 315.060 
ΔAR -0.004 0.004 -0.012 
CAPX 145.635 147.571 143.709 
ΔCAPX  0.400 0.352 0.448 
GM 709.393 731.328 687.576 
ΔGM -0.001 -0.010 0.008 
TR  0.167 0.124 0.209 
ETR -0.020 -0.029 -0.011 
LF -0.112 0.001 -0.224 
LEV 0.449 0.452 0.446 
ΔLEV -0.018 0.002 -0.039 
SG -0.090 -0.222 0.042 
    












TABLE 4 - Panel B 













     CEPS 0.085 0.077 0.022 0.203 
CEPS1 0.021 0.125 0.024 0.123 
CEPS2 0.017 0.064 0.018 0.063 
FR 0.086 0.172 0.082 0.191 
BHAR -0.069 0.101 -0.074 0.131 
SG&A Ratio 0.325 0.418 0.337 0.396 
ΔSG&A Ratio -0.048 0.601 0.162 0.196 
Sales 2204.500 1708.700 2190.520 1718.650 
ΔSales 193.275 -99.564 165.260 -53.489 
SG&A 335.321 249.839 335.287 246.721 
ΔSG&A 32.229 -8.100 35.536 -16.332 
INV 214.779 182.735 217.121 176.775 
ΔINV -0.010 0.012 -0.004 0.000 
AR 327.305 296.438 331.204 287.355 
ΔAR -0.010 0.008 -0.006 0.000 
CAPX 157.576 122.642 158.649 119.158 
ΔCAPX  1.129 -1.004 1.081 -0.985 
GM 789.088 555.956 781.267 563.173 
ΔGM 0.008 -0.017 -0.002 0.001 
TR  0.178 0.145 0.143 0.214 
ETR -0.009 -0.041 -0.015 -0.030 
LF -0.191 0.041 -0.126 -0.082 
LEV 0.450 0.447 0.435 0.478 
ΔLEV -0.032 0.007 -0.014 -0.027 
SG 0.027 -0.315 -0.047 -0.177 
     











TABLE 4 - Panel C 















     
  
CEPS 0.075 0.288 0.307 0.003 -0.067 0.054 
CEPS1 0.012 0.072 0.132 0.008 0.084 0.161 
CEPS2 0.008 0.053 0.061 0.012 0.057 0.075 
FR 0.077 0.176 0.234 0.073 0.128 0.177 
BHAR -0.080 0.060 0.205 -0.092 -0.005 0.141 
SG&A 
Ratio 0.318 0.374 0.366 0.310 0.437 0.436 
ΔSG&A 
Ratio -0.115 -0.240 -0.130 0.119 0.912 0.817 
Sales 2205.920 1406.200 2023.460 2565.860 1409.700 1778.290 
ΔSales 231.041 77.838 -87.323 200.257 -61.280 -146.136 
SG&A 319.140 176.414 295.505 427.099 191.878 274.335 
ΔSG&A 30.829 -9.155 -24.535 52.739 12.683 -16.841 
INV 212.909 122.325 205.898 259.082 144.009 204.369 
ΔINV -0.014 -0.020 -0.002 -0.001 0.015 0.018 
AR 335.715 196.680 394.093 376.579 230.484 291.561 
ΔAR -0.015 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 0.009 0.014 
CAPX 162.005 105.108 131.429 176.102 116.035 122.869 
ΔCAPX  1.206 0.069 -1.577 1.519 -0.087 -1.498 
GM 778.108 434.931 703.376 963.399 427.789 576.834 
ΔGM 0.006 0.021 -0.001 0.004 -0.031 -0.015 
TR  0.208 0.185 0.241 0.138 -0.001 0.221 
ETR -0.008 -0.006 -0.025 -0.011 -0.039 -0.054 
LF -0.253 -0.284 -0.052 -0.073 0.072 0.076 
LEV 0.410 0.503 0.497 0.476 0.417 0.442 
ΔLEV -0.045 -0.036 -0.025 -0.014 0.058 -0.022 
SG 0.110 0.039 -0.179 -0.078 -0.360 -0.368 
     
  
N          11,552  
          
4,359  
          
3,510  
          









TABLE 4 - Panel D 





















     
  
CEPS 0.064 0.087 0.180 0.396 0.186 0.427 
CEPS1 -0.001 0.025 0.035 0.108 0.093 0.171 
CEPS2 0.001 0.015 0.041 0.067 0.060 0.063 
FR 0.061 0.092 0.107 0.247 0.160 0.318 
BHAR -0.087 -0.074 0.026 0.092 0.188 0.222 
SG&A Ratio 0.132 0.503 0.122 0.626 0.148 0.584 
ΔSG&A Ratio -0.109 -0.122 -0.208 -0.271 -0.141 -0.118 
Sales 3161.310 1250.530 2210.950 601.825 3002.990 1043.930 
ΔSales 329.867 132.215 131.483 24.218 -126.049 -48.597 
SG&A 320.135 318.144 193.750 159.086 341.841 249.170 
ΔSG&A 30.916 30.743 -10.513 -7.797 -28.259 -20.811 
INV 297.275 128.543 184.813 59.864 317.446 94.350 
ΔINV -0.010 -0.018 -0.010 -0.031 -0.001 -0.002 
AR 468.738 202.691 291.704 101.700 603.871 184.316 
ΔAR -0.013 -0.016 -0.007 -0.020 0.002 -0.005 
CAPX 247.569 76.442 177.586 32.663 203.109 59.750 
ΔCAPX  1.289 1.123 0.329 -0.191 -1.908 -1.247 
GM 843.440 712.776 538.513 331.397 823.151 583.601 
ΔGM 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.036 -0.006 0.003 
TR  0.244 0.173 0.261 0.108 0.165 0.318 
ETR -0.007 -0.009 0.001 -0.013 -0.024 -0.025 
LF -0.217 -0.289 -0.172 -0.396 -0.027 -0.077 
LEV 0.571 0.248 0.755 0.250 0.700 0.293 
ΔLEV -0.044 -0.045 0.017 -0.089 -0.049 -0.001 
SG 0.097 0.123 0.014 0.064 -0.153 -0.205 
     
  
N 
          
5,776  
         
5,776  
          
2,179  
          
2,180  
           
1,755  












TABLE 4 - Panel E 





















     
  
CEPS 0.012 -0.005 -0.045 -0.089 0.024 0.084 
CEPS1 0.003 0.014 0.043 0.125 0.115 0.208 
CEPS2 0.003 0.020 0.037 0.077 0.055 0.094 
FR 0.062 0.082 0.107 0.150 0.132 0.231 
BHAR -0.077 -0.106 -0.004 -0.007 0.062 0.230 
SG&A Ratio 0.144 0.477 0.149 0.724 0.167 0.706 
ΔSG&A Ratio 0.110 0.128 0.288 1.535 0.160 1.473 
Sales 3378.690 1753.040 2412.000 407.819 2939.550 617.512 
ΔSales 252.079 148.434 -98.532 -24.043 -222.652 -69.652 
SG&A 377.558 476.639 244.510 139.267 357.649 191.056 
ΔSG&A 47.500 57.977 15.464 9.904 -20.218 -13.464 
INV 334.869 183.294 239.378 48.679 339.959 68.834 
ΔINV -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.020 0.013 0.023 
AR 466.384 286.775 391.533 69.501 481.607 101.592 
ΔAR -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.014 
CAPX 240.024 112.180 203.169 28.936 213.183 32.591 
ΔCAPX  1.188 1.850 0.104 -0.278 -1.775 -1.220 
GM 935.368 991.430 628.636 227.026 793.966 359.790 
ΔGM 0.002 0.006 -0.017 -0.045 -0.013 -0.017 
TR  0.264 0.012 0.168 -0.170 0.234 0.208 
ETR -0.013 -0.008 -0.033 -0.045 -0.046 -0.062 
LF -0.076 -0.070 0.037 0.107 0.058 0.094 
LEV 0.645 0.306 0.594 0.240 0.638 0.245 
ΔLEV 0.028 -0.056 0.034 0.082 -0.050 0.007 
SG -0.064 -0.092 -0.263 -0.456 -0.289 -0.448 
     
  
N 
          
4,792  
          
4,792  
          
2,417  
          
2,418  
           
2,488  










TABLE 4 - Panel F 






















     
  
CEPS 0.031 0.120 0.146 0.430 0.139 0.475 
CEPS1 0.004 0.021 0.047 0.096 0.096 0.167 
CEPS2 0.003 0.013 0.048 0.059 0.051 0.071 
FR 0.061 0.100 0.113 0.263 0.200 0.285 
BHAR -0.067 -0.096 0.019 0.117 0.139 0.298 
SG&A Ratio 0.283 0.353 0.282 0.466 0.325 0.406 
ΔSG&A Ratio -0.028 -0.203 -0.096 -0.383 -0.031 -0.228 
Sales 2903.040 1508.800 1987.070 825.063 2908.400 1138.520 
ΔSales 263.378 198.703 76.386 79.291 -113.842 -60.804 
SG&A 486.734 151.546 284.361 68.418 452.585 138.426 
ΔSG&A 43.275 18.384 -9.471 -8.839 -27.088 -21.982 
INV 299.316 126.502 182.447 62.175 308.255 103.540 
ΔINV -0.003 -0.024 -0.006 -0.035 0.002 -0.005 
AR 439.511 231.919 290.426 102.891 507.002 281.185 
ΔAR -0.004 -0.025 -0.001 -0.026 0.000 -0.004 
CAPX 180.847 143.163 134.402 75.801 189.022 73.837 
ΔCAPX  1.177 1.235 -0.289 0.427 -1.355 -1.800 
GM 1119.230 436.991 658.207 211.553 1068.740 338.008 
ΔGM 0.000 0.012 -0.002 0.045 -0.007 0.004 
TR  0.251 0.166 0.260 0.109 0.213 0.270 
ETR -0.006 -0.010 -0.019 0.007 -0.038 -0.011 
LF -0.091 -0.415 -0.082 -0.486 -0.014 -0.090 
LEV 0.425 0.394 0.632 0.373 0.616 0.377 
ΔLEV -0.046 -0.044 -0.082 0.010 -0.039 -0.011 
SG 0.004 0.217 -0.045 0.123 -0.140 -0.218 
     
  
N 
          
5,776  
         
5,776  
          
2,180  
          
2,179  
           
1,755  










TABLE 4 - Panel G 






















     
  
CEPS 0.012 -0.005 -0.037 -0.097 0.080 0.027 
CEPS1 0.000 0.017 0.028 0.140 0.093 0.230 
CEPS2 0.006 0.017 0.042 0.073 0.056 0.096 
FR 0.065 0.083 0.110 0.154 0.135 0.231 
BHAR -0.060 -0.132 0.018 -0.037 0.119 0.168 
SG&A Ratio 0.287 0.334 0.282 0.592 0.325 0.548 
ΔSG&A Ratio 0.023 0.216 0.109 1.715 0.046 1.588 
Sales 3503.550 1628.170 2147.990 671.105 2622.980 933.259 
ΔSales 247.409 153.104 -60.813 -61.747 -158.568 -133.700 
SG&A 597.427 256.770 303.559 80.150 436.803 111.801 
ΔSG&A 60.804 44.673 13.901 11.465 -22.486 -11.193 
INV 358.934 159.229 220.686 67.300 305.370 103.326 
ΔINV -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.024 0.004 0.032 
AR 518.030 235.129 367.884 93.027 436.747 146.316 
ΔAR -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.019 0.002 0.026 
CAPX 206.456 145.749 151.668 80.386 149.043 96.683 
ΔCAPX  1.372 1.665 -0.167 -0.007 -1.732 -1.263 
GM 1335.620 591.179 670.192 185.286 923.051 230.475 
ΔGM 0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.057 -0.005 -0.026 
TR  0.194 0.081 -0.100 0.097 0.341 0.100 
ETR -0.007 -0.015 -0.042 -0.036 -0.028 -0.081 
LF -0.070 -0.076 0.002 0.143 0.000 0.151 
LEV 0.464 0.487 0.490 0.343 0.546 0.337 
ΔLEV -0.032 0.004 0.012 0.104 -0.053 0.010 
SG -0.033 -0.123 -0.157 -0.562 -0.183 -0.553 
     
  
N            4,792  
          
4,792  
          
2,418  
          
2,417  
           
2,449  




TABLE 5  
Definitions of Variables 
 
Dependent Variables Measurement 
One-Year-Ahead Earnings 
Change (CEPS1i,t) 
[Adjusted Earnings Per Sharei,t+1 - Adjusted Earnings Per 
Sharei,t] / Adjusted Ending Stock Pricet-1 
Two-Year-Ahead Earnings 
Change (CEPS2i,t) 
[Adjusted Earnings Per Sharei,t+2 - Adjusted Earnings Per 
Sharei,t+1] / Adjusted Ending Stock Pricet-1 
One-Year-Ahead Analyst 
Forecast Revision (FRi,t) 
[(Consensus Analyst Forecast for t+1 Issued in t+1 - Adjusted 
Earnings Per Sharei,t) - (Consensus Analyst Forecast for t+1 
Issued in t - Consensus Analyst Forecast for t Issued in t)] / 
Adjusted Ending Stock Pricet-1 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARi,t) 
Size adjusted, buy-and-hold abnormal return of firm i 
cumulated from the end of the third month after the fiscal 
year-end of year t through 12 subsequent months. 
 
Fundamental Signals Measurement 
Current Year Earnings 
Change (CEPSi,t) 
[Adjusted Earnings Per Sharei,t - Adjusted Earnings Per Sharei,t-1] / 
Adjusted Ending Stock Pricet-1 
Change in Inventory 
(ΔINVi,t) (Inventoryi,t / Salesi,t) - (Inventoryi,t-1 / Salesi,t-1) 
Change in Accounts 
Receivable (ΔARi,t) (Accounts Receivablei,t / Salesi,t) - (Accounts Receivablei,t-1 / Salesi,t-1) 
Change in Capital 
Expenditures 
(ΔCAPXi,t) 
(Firm Capital Expendituresi,t / Industry Capital Expendituresi,t) - (Firm 
Capital Expendituresi,t-1 / Industry Capital Expendituresi,t-1) 
Change in Gross 
Margin (ΔGMi,t) (Gross Margini,t / Salesi,t) - (Gross Margini,t-1 / Salesi,t-1) 
Effective Tax Rate 
(ETRi,t) [(Average Tax Rate from t-3 to t-1 - Tax Rate in t) * CEPSi,t] 
Labor Force (LFi,t) 
[(Salesi,t-1 / # of Employeesi,t-1) - (Salesi,t / # of Employeesi,t)] / (Salesi,t-
1 / # of Employeesi,t-1) 
Change in Leverage 
(ΔLEVi,t) (Long Term Debti,t / Equityi,t) - (Long Term Debti,t-1 / Equityi,t-1) 
Sales Growth 









TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Independent Variables 
of Interest Measurement 
Change in SG&A Ratio 
(∆SGA_Ratioi,t) 
[(SG&A Costsi,t / Salesi,t) - (SG&A Costsi,t-1 / Salesi,t-1)] / (SG&A 
Costsi,t / Salesi,t) 
Increasing Sales 
Subsample 
(SS_Inc_Salesi,t) Change in SG&A ratio when sales increase, and 0 otherwise. 
Decreasing Sales 
Subsample 
(SS_Dec_Salesi,t) Change in SG&A ratio when sales decrease, and 0 otherwise. 
Increasing SG&A Costs 
Subsample 
(SS_Inc_SGAi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A expense increases, and 0 
otherwise. 
Decreasing SG&A Costs 
Subsample 
(SS_Dec_SGAi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A expense decreases, and 0 
otherwise. 
Subsample 1 (SS_1i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 2 (SS_2i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 3 (SS_3i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 4 (SS_4i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 5 (SS_5i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs increase, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 6 (SS_6i,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 






















TABLE 5 (Continued) 




of Interest Measurement 
Subsample 1 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_1_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 
Subsample 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 1 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_1_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 2 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_2_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 
Subsample 2, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 2 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_2_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 2, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 3 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_3_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 
Subsample 3, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 3 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_3_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 3, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 4 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_4_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 4, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 4 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_4_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 
Subsample 4, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 5 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_5_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 5 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_5_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs increase, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 
Subsample 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 6 Lower 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_6_Lower_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is below the median for 
Subsample 6, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 6 Higher 
SG&A Ratio 
(SS_6_Higher_Ratioi,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and SG&A ratio is above the median for 









TABLE 5 (Continued) 




of Interest Measurement 
Subsample 1 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_1_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 1 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_1_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
above the median for Subsample 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 2 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_2_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 2, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 2 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_2_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
above the median for Subsample 2, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 3 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_3_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 3, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 3 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_3_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio decreases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
above the median for Subsample 3, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 4 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_4_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 4, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 4 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_4_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales increase, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
above the median for Subsample 4, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 5 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_5_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 5 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_5_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs increase, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
above the median for Subsample 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 6 Smaller 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_6_Smaller_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 
below the median for Subsample 6, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsample 6 Higher 
SG&A Ratio Change 
(SS_6_Higher_Changei,t) 
Change in SG&A ratio when SG&A ratio increases, sales decrease, 
and SG&A costs decrease, and the change in the SG&A ratio is 









TABLE 6 - Panel A 






DV = CEPS1 






























































































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. P-values provided in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6 - Panel B 
Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on SG&A Costs Subsample and 





DV = CEPS1 
   Intercept 0.0483***  0.0516*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SS_Inc_SG&A 0.0019   
 
(0.1062)   
SS_Dec_SG&A 0.0015***   
 
(<.0001)   
SS_1   0.1660*** 
 
  (<.0001) 
SS_2   -0.0876*** 
 
  (0.0011) 
SS_3   -0.0171 
 
  (0.3515) 
SS_4   -0.0216** 
  
 (0.0430) 
SS_5  0.0019 
   
(0.1086) 
SS_6 0.0016*** 
   
(0.0001) 
CEPS -0.0019 -0.0061 
 
(0.8314)  (0.5041) 
ΔINV -0.2252***  -0.2215*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔAR -0.0205  -0.0257 
 
(0.5067)  (0.4066) 
ΔCAPX  -0.0004***  -0.0003*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔGM -0.1661***  -0.1681*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ETR -0.0497***  -0.0496*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
LF -0.0357***  -0.0450*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔLEV -0.0015  -0.0014 
 
(0.1721)  (0.1802) 
Growth -0.0286***  -0.0259*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 
   
N 38,737  38,737 
Adj R
2
 1.700%  1.998% 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. P-values provided in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7 - Panel A 





DV = CEPS2 





































































































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
















TABLE 7 - Panel B 
Regressions of Two-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on SG&A Costs Subsample and 





DV = CEPS2 
   Intercept 0.0330***  0.0319*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 








 SS_1   0.0381* 
 
  (0.0962) 
SS_2   -0.0929*** 
 
  (<.0001) 
SS_3   -0.0077 
 
  (0.2041) 
SS_4   0.0058 
  
 (0.4400) 
SS_5  0.0023** 
   
(0.0305) 
SS_6 0.0006* 
   
(0.0960) 
CEPS1 -0.0959*** -0.0972*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔINV 0.0016  0.0088 
 
(0.9637)  (0.8000) 
ΔAR -0.0859**  -0.0864*** 
 
(0.0015)  (0.0014) 
ΔCAPX  -0.0003***  -0.0003*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔGM -0.0590***  -0.0657*** 
 
(0.0033)  (0.0011) 
ETR -0.0240***  -0.0242*** 
 
(0.0020)  (0.0018) 
LF -0.0114**  -0.0099* 
 
(0.0322)  (0.0959) 
ΔLEV -0.0003  -0.0004 
 
(0.6973)  (0.6782) 
Growth -0.0140***  -0.0137*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 
   
N 33,232  33,232 
Adj R
2
 1.722%  1.860% 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. P-values provided in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8 - Panel A 





DV = FR 



































































































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 8 - Panel B 





DV = FR 
   Intercept 0.1005***  0.0917*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SS_Inc_SG&A 0.0311***   
 
(0.0017)   
SS_Dec_SG&A -0.0011   
 






SS_2  -0.3086*** 
 
  (0.0008) 
SS_3   -0.6366*** 
 
  (0.0089) 
SS_4   0.0325 
 









   
(0.0770) 
CEPS 0.2715*** 0.2415*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ΔINV -0.0783  -0.0772 
 
(0.5815)  (0.5844) 
ΔAR 0.0303  0.0260 
 
(0.7821)  (0.8134) 
ΔCAPX -0.0004***  -0.0003** 
 
(0.0020)  (0.0114) 
ΔGM -0.1718***  -0.1527 
 
(0.0594)  (0.0943) 
ETR -0.0438  -0.0440 
 
(0.2234)  (0.2184) 
LF -0.0080  0.0065 
 
(0.7263)  (0.8060) 
ΔLEV 0.0027  0.0026 
 
(0.3712)  (0.3859) 
GROWTH 0.0000  0.0059 
 
(0.9996)  (0.4526) 
 
   
N 11,030  11,030 
Adj R
2
 2.455%  2.954% 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-




TABLE 9 - Panel A 





DV = BHAR 
















































































   
(<.0001) 








***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-



















TABLE 9 - Panel B 





DV = BHAR 
   Intercept -0.0150**  -0.0332*** 
 
(0.0399)  (<.0001) 
SS_Inc_Sales -0.0955**  -0.1002** 
 
(0.0196)  (0.0121) 
SS_Dec_Sales -0.0131  -0.0276 
 
(0.4813)  (0.1732) 
CEPS 0.1341***  0.0704* 
 
(0.0004)  (0.0769) 
ΔINV -0.5676***  -0.8072*** 
 
(0.0059)  (<.0001) 
ΔAR -0.0780  -0.1285 
 






ΔGM -0.2547**  -0.2488* 
 
(0.0388)  (0.0588) 
ETR 0.0020  0.0201 
 
(0.9480)  (0.4688) 
LF 0.1307***  0.1919*** 
 
(0.0004)  (<.0001) 
ΔLEV 0.0067*  0.0041 
 
(0.0534)  (0.2421) 
GROWTH 0.0281  0.0476 
 








N 11,929   10,565  
Adj R
2
 0.732%  1.885% 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
















TABLE 9 - Panel C 





DV = BHAR 























































































   
(<.0001) 
   
 








***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 9 - Panel D 





DV = BHAR 
   Intercept -0.0150*  -0.0332*** 
 
(0.0605)  (<.0001) 
SS_1 0.4187***  0.2627** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0349) 
SS_2 -0.3164**  -0.2170 
 
(0.0303)  (0.1451) 
SS_3 -1.3840***  -1.3048*** 
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 















CEPS 0.0850** 0.0337 
 
(0.0300)  (0.4127) 
ΔINV -0.6371***  -0.8545*** 
 
(0.0019)  (<.0001) 
ΔAR -0.1045  -0.1476 
 
(0.5133)  (0.4128) 
ΔCAPX -0.0010***  -0.0008** 
 
(0.0032)  (0.0173) 
ΔGM -0.1883  -0.1955 
 
(0.1282)  -0.1402 
ETR 0.0065  0.0213 
 
(0.8260)  (0.4358) 
LF 0.0757*  0.1487*** 
 
(0.0526)  (0.0003) 
ΔLEV 0.0065*  0.0041 
 
(0.0582)  (0.2406) 
GROWTH 0.0523  0.0640 
 
(0.2044)  (0.1846) 





N 11,929   10,565  
Adj R
2
 1.659%  2.478% 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-






TABLE 10  
Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower 
and Higher SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(21) 
DV = CEPS1 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower 
































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-




















TABLE 11  
Regressions of Two-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower 
and Higher SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(22) 
DV = CEPS2 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 11 (Continued) 
Regressions of Two-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower 


































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 12  




DV = FR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 12 (Continued) 



































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 13  
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower and 
Higher SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(24) 
DV = BHAR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 13 (Continued) 
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower and 


































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 14  
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower and 
Higher SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(25) 
DV = BHAR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-












TABLE 14 (Continued) 
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Lower and 




































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-





















TABLE 15  
Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by 
Smaller and Larger Change in the SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(26) 
DV = CEPS1 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 15 (Continued) 
Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by 
































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 16  
Regressions of Two-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by 
Smaller and Larger Change in the SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(27) 
DV = CEPS2 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-













TABLE 16 (Continued) 
Regressions of Two-Year-Ahead Change in EPS on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by 


































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 17  
Regressions of Forecast Revisions on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and Larger 
Change in the SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(28) 
DV = FR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 17 (Continued) 
Regressions of Forecast Revisions on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and Larger 


































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 18  
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and 
Larger Change in the SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(29) 
DV = BHAR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 18 (Continued) 
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and 


































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-























TABLE 19  
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and 
Larger Change in the SG&A Ratio 
 
EQ(30) 
DV = BHAR 







































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-














TABLE 19 (Continued) 
Regressions of Buy and Hold Returns on Subsamples 1 through 6 Split by Smaller and 




































***, **, * denotes statistical significance at <.01, <.05 and <.10 levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. P-values provided in parentheses. 
 
